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TRANSITION IN CROATIA
Neke napomene uz rad Yoji Koyame
transition in Croatia
Nema nijedne zemlje u tranziciji koja ima tako dugu bogatu reformsku i tr-
žišnu tradiciju kao Hrvatska i Slovenija. To, razumije se, vrijedi i za druge zemlje 
nastale razdruživanjem bivše Jugoslavije. Zato se na međunarodnoj znanstvenoj i 
političkoj sceni očekivalo da će upravo te zemlje biti na čelu tranzicijske kolone 
upravo onako kao što su dugi niz godina bile na čelu reformske kolone. Eksplo-
zija balkanskog nacionalizma onemogućila je takva očekivanja. Izuzetak je samo 
Slovenija koja je i dalje ostala na čelu kolone.
Međutim i bez obzira na tako neočekivani stjecaj događanja brojni ekonomisti 
znanstvenici posvećuju daleko veću pozornost našim reformskim i tranzicijskim 
dostignućima nego mi sami. Da ne spominjem brojne radove iz dulje povijesne 
retrospektive, spomenut ću samo dvije najnovije knjige. Prvu je prošle godine u 
SAD objavio David Prychitko pod naslovom “Markets, Planning and Democracy, 
New Thinking in Political Economy”. Drugu knjigu je ove godine u Japanu objavio 
poznati japanski ekonomist Yoji Koyama koji se dugo godina bavi sa kompara-
tivnim studijama. Knjiga je objavljena pod naslovom “South Eastern Europe in 
Transition”. Najvećim dijelom je posvećena događanjima u zemljama nastalim na 
prostorima bivše Jugoslavije.
U ovoj se knjizi daje široki pogled na reformska i tranzicijska događanja u biv-
šoj državi. Citiraju se brojni autori koji su tijekom mnogih godina radili na reformi 
i tranziciji. Ova knjiga predstavlja jedan od najcjelovitijih pogleda stranog autora 
koji se dugi niz godina komparativno bavi reformskim i tranzicijskim događanjima 
Yoji Koyama*
* Y. Koyama, profesor na Ekonomskom fakultetu Sveučilišta Niigata, Japan.
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u nas. Prilog koji objavljujemo pod naslovom Transition in Croatia predstavlja dio 
knjige posvećen Hrvatskoj. Interesantno je zapaziti vrlo dobro poznavanje hrvatskih 
autora i njihovog doprinosa u pripremanju reforme i ostvarenju tranzicije. Branka 
Horvata spominje kao doajena hrvatske ekonomske misli, međutim odgovarajuću 
pozornost posvećuje i brojnim drugim hrvatskim ekonomistima i znanstvenicima. 
U svakom slučaju valja pozdraviti i samu činjenicu da je jedan autor, ekonomist 
znanstvenik iz dalekog Japana tako mnogo vremena i znanstvenih napora posvetio 
istraživanju reformskih i tranzicijskih događanja na ovim prostorima. Posebnu za-
hvalnost mu upućujemo zbog suglasnosti da se ovaj tekst tj. dio spomenute knjige 
objavi u našem časopisu.
Some Remarks on Yoji Koyama’s “Transition in Croatia”
No country in transition has such a long and rich reform and market tradition 
as Croatia and Slovenia have. That also concerns the other countries which grew 
up after disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia. Therefore the international scientifi c and 
political scene expected that these very countries would be at the top of transitional 
group, exactly in a way they had been at the top of reform group for many years. 
The explosion of the Balkan nationalism prevented such expectations. The only 
exception is Slovenia which is still at the top of group.
Regardless to such unexpected occurences, many economic researchers pay 
much more attention to our reform and transitional achievements than we do oursel-
ves. To avoid numerous works from a long historical retrospective, I will mention 
only two most recent books. “Markets, Planning and Democracy, New Thinking in 
Political Economy” by David Prychitko, is published in USA last year. The second 
book “South Eastern Europe in Transition” by a well known Japanese economist 
Yoji Koyama, who has been engaged in comparative studies for many years, has 
been published this year. It is mostly dedicated to the countries of ex-Yugoslavia.
The book gives a broad consideration of reforms and transitional efforts in 
former state. Numerous authors, for many years connected  with reform and tran-
sition, have been cited. This book is one of the most complete prospects gathered 
in one work by a foreign author who has been comparatively involved in reform 
and transition. “Transition in Croatia” is a part of book dedicated to Croatia. It 
is very interesting to note a very good knowledge of Croatian authors and their 
contribution to reform preparation and realization of transition. Branko Horvat is 
mentioned as a doyen of Croatian economic thought, but the author also pays a 
corresponding attention to other numerous Croatian economists and scientists. It is 
praiseworthy that one author who is the economic scientist from remote Japan, has 
spent so much time and effort to do research in reform and transitional happenings 
on these territories. We would like to thank him for his agreement to publish the 
part of the mentioned book in our journal.
                                                                                      Dragomir Vojnić
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Transition in Croatia had to be carried out simultaneously with its 
hard independence war. Western countries responded warmly to Croatia 
at the time of independence, but Tudjman’s too open nationalistic course 
has gradually repelled these countries. In 1991-1995, the fi nancial aid 
from the EU has been limited only to the aid for humanistic purposes1. 
Towards the end of 1990s Tudjman’s course became deadlocked. Incre-
asing dissatisfaction among people led to a victory of opposing parties 
at the general elections in January 2000. The new coalition government, 
with Social Democratic Party as its center, embarked on the economic 
restructuring and the efforts for the EU membership.
Croatian Economy after Independence
Although Croatia attained its independence, the sacrifi ce was not small. 1n 
autumn the Croatian army entered the state of war against JNA (Yugoslav Federal 
Army). In spring 1992 foci of the battle removed to the territory of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Croatia regained calm. However, a third of its territory came 
under the rule of Serbian forces, and such an `irregular condition’ continued until 
July 1995. Manufacturing industry was severely hit by the war, with about a third 
of its capacity damaged (Fujimura, 1996, p.77). As a result, GDP in 1993 was lo-
wer than the 1990 level by 39%. At the same time, prices were galloping, and the 
annual rate of infl ation exceeded 1100% in 1993 (see Table 1).
In October the Stabilization Programme was implemented. It was a program 
of two phases: The fi rst phase as a heterodox anti-infl ationary programme and 
the second phase as structural reforms. During the fi rst phase, the central bank 
tightened monetary policy and liberalized the foreign exchange market, while the 
government realigned prices of public utilities to eliminate losses burdening the 
budget, and placed controls on wage in the public sector. Only in a year the infl ation 
has calmed down, and the central bank’s reserve began to increase. In May 1994 
a new currency Kuna was introduced, replacing Dinar. The second phase of the 
1 Its continuous discrimination against Serbs, who were ousted from Krajna district by the 
Croatian army’s blitz tactics in August 1995, and the inducement of Bosnian Croats to settle in their 
houses contravened the Dayton accord of November 1995. Under pressure from the US, the World 
Bank cancelled a US$ 30 million loan for the reinforcement of banking system in Croatia, and the 
IMF also postponed a loan to Croatia. The negotiation for its membership in the WTO was suspended 
under pressure from the US and the EU. Its negotiation with the EU on cooperation agreement, which 
began in June 1995, was also suspended in August. Although in June 1995 Croatia was offi cially 
included in the group of recipients of PHARE programme, its implementation was also suspended 
in August.
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Stabilization Program involved structural reforms which were intended to assure 
long-term economic stability. Its key points were fi scal reform, acceleration of 
privatization, restructuring of loss-making public sector enterprises, restructuring 
of the banking system and development of fi nancial system (Jovancevic, 1999, 
pp.240-241).
Before its independence, Croatia’s total foreign trade volume amounted to 
100% of its GDP (Samardzija, 1997, p.107). Croatian exports in 1990, including 
trade with other  republics  of former Yugoslavia, as well as trade in material services 
Table 1  
CROATIA’S MACRO ECONOMIC INDICATORS,1992-2000
 
Source: EBRD (2000), p.153; Date for 1990 are taken from EBRD (1997), p.220.
Note: * A sharp decrease in unemployment rate from 14.5% in 1995 to 10.0% 
in 1996 is strange because in 1996 demobilized soldiers appeared on the labour 
market, and this must push up the unemployment rate. I guess there was a change 
in methodology of measurement of unemployment between these two years. Ac-
cording to a different source (Jovancevic, 1999, p.246), the unemployment rate is 
16.4% in 1996, 17.5% in 1997, 17.6% in 1998 and 19.0% in 1999.
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was estimated at US$ 13.7 billion, approximately two thirds of the GDP. However, 
following the overall downturn in the economy, a sharp fall of the revenue from 
services, and a loss of markets in two neighboring countries, the total export fi gure 
was more than halved to a mere US$ 5.7 billion in 1993 (Samardzija, 1997, p.35). 
With the year 1993 as a bottom, in 1994 Croatian economy began to recover qu-
ickly. Then wages increased more quickly, which might have negative effects on 
economic performances, as Samardzija concerned herself. In 1995 only, real wages 
increased by almost 40% in Croatia. It seems to me that this is because wages had 
been suppressed for a while and abruptly at this time increased on the rebound. 
Anyway, this resulted in a boom in domestic demand and a 44% upsurge in imports 
but no real progress in terms of GDP (Samardzija, 1997, p.104). There remained 
a slump in export, which covered only 62% of import in 1995. In this connection, 
Croatia’s ratio of export to import was 93.7% in 1973 and 86.3% in 1988, one of 
closing years of the former Yugoslavia. Compared with these fi gures, a slump in 
export in 1990s was very serious (SGJ 1989, p.325, p.418).
The composition of foreign trade partners has gradually changed. The share 
of West European countries has increased. In 1992 the share of EU in the total 
export accounted for 52.45%, former Yugoslavia 31.97% and Central East Euro-
pean countries (CEEC) and ex-USSR 5.79%. In 1995 the share of EU in the total 
export has increased to 58% while the share of former Yugoslavia and CEEC and 
ex-USSR accounted for 23% and 9% respectively. In 1992 the share of EU in the 
total import accounted for 46.79%, former Yugoslavia 23.24% and CEEC and 
ex-USSR 13.58%. In 1995 the share of EU in the total import has increased to 
62.16% while former Yugoslavia and CEEC and ex-USSR accounted for 11.31 % 
and 9.31 % respectively. Let me see Croatia’s foreign trade by countries. In 1995 
the fi rst place in its export was occupied by Italy (23.7%), followed by Germany 
(21.5%), Slovenia (13.1 %), Bosnia and Herzegovina ( 8.3%), Austria (4.3%), 
Russia (3.3%), France (2.4%), Liberia (2.3), USA (1.8%) and Netherlands (1.7%). 
In the same year the fi rst place in Croatia’s import occupied by Germany (20.1 %), 
followed by Italy (18.2%), Slovenia (10.7%), Austria (7.7%), UK (6.1%), USA 
(2.7%), Libya (2.5%), France (2.5%), Netherlands (2.3%), Switzerland (2.2%) 
(Samardzija, 1997, pp.106-109).
Nowadays the implementation of the second phase is negatively mentioned 
(Chamber of economy, 2000, p.2). Indeed such a violent infl ation has calmed down 
within in a short time in 1993-1994. In this regard, Stabilization Programme of the 
economy was a success story as Ivan Teodorovic admits. However, he criticized 
the implementation of the second phase of the Stabilization Programme, saying 
as follows: “Economic policy that allowed for increasing domestic consumption 
and rising foreign debt in hand with a softening of the budget constraint had to 
end up with a softening of the entire fi scal system. Thus, a slowing down and in 
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some aspects the reversal of the reform process had threefold effects: stagnant 





In April 1991 the law on transformation of social enterprises (the so-called 
law on privatization) was adopted. This law defi ned permissible paths and the ge-
neral framework, and two of the supplementary laws provided the basis for direct 
state involvement in any sector of the economy. The strategy of privatization in 
Croatia had some characteristics: First, the state nationalized social capital and 
became an owner of 80% of the social capital; Secondly, the legislation provided 
the government with a prominent role and extensive discretionary powers in the 
privatization of re-nationalized enterprises; Thirdly, the legislation did not include 
any voucher schemes, but instead it introduced a system of discount in purchase of 
shares and gave priority to employees of the enterprise concerned; Fourthly, it was 
“revenue oriented” privatization (Bicanic, 1993, p.426). In this regard, more defi nite 
explanation was given by Kalogjera, describing that one of basic objectives of the 
privatization is to obtain funds necessary for paying public debts and fi nancing 
recovery of the country by the sale of enterprises (Kalogjera, 1993, p.63).
As for the point that in initiating the privatization a big power was given to 
the state, the two doyen of the Croatian academic circles in economics critically 
described. Stressing the fact that in the years 1950-52 the process of shifting from 
a command economy to a market economy was fi rmly initiated in Croatia (former 
Yugoslavia) and in the following eight years, 60 per cent of the prices were com-
pletely liberalized, Branko Horvat characterized the privatization implemented in 
1990s as backward transition. Similarly; in the keynote speech at the international 
conference in 1999 Dragomir Vojnic said as follows:
Among all its advantages, Croatia only exploited market tradition to a certain 
degree. Thus, during the war, it did not have to introduce the war economy. 
However, all other advantages are not used. That refers to social ownership 
which represented by itself a very good basis for effi cient realization of the 
fundamental segment of transition, that is, privatization. Already in the fi rst 
step of privatization, the method of transformation abolished all advantages 
of social ownership, a step backward in the direction of state was made. Alt-
hough state ownership had to have only a temporary character of transitive 
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form of ownership, the consequences were very diffi cult. It appeared to be a 
legal and institutional vacuum. The process of circulation and concentration 
of capital did not develop on the basis of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial 
capability, but on the basis of political fi tness (Vojnic, 1999, p. 17).
Although Croatia was ostensibly democratized, the political style represented 
by the former President Franjo Tudjman was rather authoritarian. Croatian Demo-
cratic Union (HDZ) had power since the election in Spring 1990. Owing to the 
single-member constituency system, with 48% of the total votes, HDZ was able 
to gain 65% of the seats in the Parliament. The fi rst party in opposition has rotated 
at every general election in such a way that it was the former Communist party 
in 1990, Liberal party in 1992 and another party in 1996. Therefore, the political 
predominance of HDZ had never shaken until 2000. Ironically enough, such frailty 
of the opposition has brought a kind of stability of the regime at that time2. Ac-
cording to Puhovski, “All the really important decisions are made in some kind of 
court around president Tudjman, offi cially called the national defense and security 
council”(Puhovski, 1999, p.20).
The Process of Privatization
In 1991 the Privatization Agency and the Development Fund were established 
as organizations which should inherit the legal framework of the Federation and pro-
mote privatization. The role of the Privatization Agency was to check the submitted 
plans and supervise and monitor the privatization of enterprises. The proceeds of 
the sale went to the Development Fund. These were powerful organizations. The 
Agency had the power to install managers into loss-making enterprises. The Fund 
had equally great powers and no direct accountability. In its portfolio it had shares 
from almost all enterprises in the economy, making it the largest asset owner and 
thereby a market maker on the nascent stock exchange. For enterprises which it 
owned, it appointed managers and could initiate privatization when and how it 
saw fi t. The two organizations merged into the Croatian Fund for Privatization in 
January 1993 (Bicanic, 1993, pp.422-428).
According to Bicanic, the privatization itself involved three rounds of share 
selling as well as allocating packages of shares to the development and pension 
funds. The fi rst round was the sale of shares at a discount to employees, the second 
round was the sale of shares at full price to employees, and the third was the sale 
2 Interview with Professor Ivan Grdesic at Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb on July 9, 
1997.
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of shares without a discount to the general public. Shares in the fi rst two rounds 
could be purchased by paying in installments for a period up to fi ve years. Largest 
discounts were given to the employees when buying shares of “their” enterprises. 
The discounts were limited up to the value of 20,000 DM per individual purchase. 
These discounts were contingent upon the mode of payment and years of emplo-
yment. The total value of shares sold in the fi rst round was not allowed to exceed 
50% of the total estimated value of the enterprise’s assets (Bicanic, 1993, p.433).
It is said that managerial buyouts were preferred in the actual privatization. In 
this regard, Bicanic pointed out the problems, using an odd expression such as “the 
frequency and form of bending and rules and breaking the law”. The most frequently 
reported way that managers attempted to buy a dominant position in companies 
were “managerial loans”, “manager’s insurance schemes”, and “ghost buyers on one 
side and by undervaluing assets on the other”(Bicanic, p.435). “Managerial loans” 
are part of completely untransparent system by which top managers receive large 
and favorable loans from banks (whose managers are their established business 
partners and often friends) up to ten thousand DM. Sometimes the banks accept as 
collateral the shares themselves, overvalued real estate, or frozen “foreign currency 
savings deposits” (Bicanic, 1993, p.435; Kalogjera, 1993, p.81). The second way 
involved enterprises paying large insurance premiums for their managers which 
were then cashed for a discount at banks and the cash was used by managers to 
buy shares. The third way was to pay workers to act as ghost buyers of shares with 
large discounts and then sell them on the black market or cede them to a manager. 
Managers as sellers were frequently the main buyers due to the large number of 
managerial buyouts. Nevertheless, regarding asset evaluation, the legislation offered 
opportunity for undervaluing and incorrectly valuing assets (for example, location 
was not used in evaluation, book value was used in spite of infl ation). Managers 
were not the only ones breaking and bending the rules. The privatization agency 
has been often accused of using privatization legislation for noneconomic (mostly 
political) goals. The most noted examples that Bicanic mentioned were the repla-
cement of enterprises managers by party faithfuls in Istra and attempts to infl uence 
the media by putting the independent dailies and weeklies into receivership or 
regulating privatization by preventing employee buyouts so that the funds (and 
thus state) become majority power (Bicanic, 1993, pp.436).
Privatization at a Stalemate
In 1997 the privatization came to a standstill. According to the research by 
KopintDatorg, a Hungarian research organization, a defi ciency of privatization pra-
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ctice so far has been that it has not been extended to the banking sector, the energy 
industry, public utilities companies and armament industry. The most widespread 
method of privatization has been the sale of a half of the share of a company to 
employees at a discounted price. A majority of non-privatized equity was handled 
by the Privatization Fund, another part was controlled by the pension funds, while 
fi ve per cent was used for compensation. In the course of privatization, small and 
medium-sized companies have been purchased by employees and management 
using preferential credits. In contrast, large companies, which were nationalized 
at fi rst, came under the management of confi dants of the ruling party (E T, Vol.6, 
No.3, pp.176-177). As Drazen Kalogjera said, “every privatization is carried out 
favorably to ruling parties”3. In the case of Croatia, where the Croatian Democratic 
Union (HDZ) headed by Tudjman occupied a majority of the seats in the Parliament 
and maintained the Government from the election in April 1990 till January 2000, 
the evil is evident.
As of 1997 it was said offcially that 50% of all the enterprises were privatized. 
However, Kalogjera was skeptical to such a viewpoint. He argued that as a matter 
of fact 80% of all the enterprises were in hands of the State or under the control 
of the State. Nenad Zakosek depicted the situation in 1996 as follows: About 
560,000 shareholders (which corresponded to some 12 % of Croatian population) 
in different companies, including both employees and managers, emerged out of 
the privatization process. There are unfavourable features: (a) ineffective capital 
markets, (b) negligible foreign investments, (c) lack of domestic capital, and (d) 
the fact that main privatization transaction are still controlled by the State instead 
of being channelled through stock markets. These features are limiting the priva-
tization process (Zakosek, 1996, p.93).
According to Vojnic, hundreds of thousands of small share-holders found 
themselves in a very specifi c situation. This specifi c situation refl ects the fact that 
besides formal rights given by the law, -they were plundered; because of restricted 
purchasing power, they could not repay their shares. Thus, a small number of tycoons 
supported by the ruling structures, concentrated huge wealth in their hands. These 
deviations cover a broad range from mass small crime, bribery and corruption, all 
to the organized crime on various levels of economy and society. Using expressions 
such as the classical appearance of “mafi acracy”, “savage capitalism” and “primitive 
accumulation”, Vojnic criticized the practice of privatization in Croatia. He said 
that in such a situation, the akeady relatively developed middle class, which is the 
foundation of civic society, has almost disappeared. In Croatia, which was best 
prepared for transition, the situation similar to that of Russia has appeared. Vojnic 
ascribed such deviations to the fact that advice of the World Bank and the IMF, 
3 Interview with Professor Drazen Kalogjera in Zagreb on July 10, 1997.
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based on the concept “Washington Consensus”, was applied to a macroeconomic 
and macropolitical environment specifi c to Croatia (Vojnic, pp.17-20).
Reorganization of the Banking System
According to Jovancevic, the break-up of the monetary system of the former 
Yugoslavia caused Croatian banks to become insolvent in technical terms. Large 
amount of banks claims on the National Bank of Yugoslavia became impossible 
to collect and, hence, household foreign currency deposits has been frozen since 
1991. In addition, numerous companies found themselves in serious diffi culties 
and were unable to repay their debts to banks. Consequently, the government reca-
pitalized a number of major companies through the issue of treasury bonds called 
“big bond”, which were used by these companies for their repayment of debts 
(Jovancevic, 1999, p.241).
The real enlargement of fi xed assets from domestic sources was very small in 
1990s. There are several reasons for that. Firstly, except a short period (1995-1997), 
the deposit rate has always been lower than the infl ation rate since independence (see 
Table 1). As a result, the marginal propensity to save has been small; Second, highly 
fi xed exchange rate did not encourage domestic industries to export orientation, so 
that the volume of production remained relatively low (proportionate to the size of 
domestic market) with high fi xed costs of unit value of production. Consequently, 
the performance of domestic manufacturers and service activities have been not 
so profi table. As a result, savings on the enterprises’ side remained also very low 
level; Third, the limited amount of domestic funds makes the price of capital (i.e. 
interest rate) more expensive. For example, the lending rate in 1995 was 22.3%, 
which was extraordinarily high, taking into consideration that the infl ation rate in 
that year was 6.1 % (see Table 1). This might be related to the circumstances that 
the banking system was ineffi cient at that time; Fourth, as capital markets did not 
function suffi ciently yet, it was not easy for enterprises to fi nance their equipment 
investment through this route. Thus essential modernization of production capacities 
became more diffi cult (Jovancevic, 1999, pp.255-256).
As domestic sources of funds were extremely limited, the objective condition 
of the Croatian economy keenly needed foreign direct investment, but the amount 
of FDI infl ow was quite small until mid 1990s (see Table 2). As mentioned above, 
it refl ected reluctant Croatian side’s resistance to foreign investment as well as bad 
external relation of the government (Chamber of Economy, 2000, p.2). At length 
in August 1996 the both governments of Croatia and FR Yugoslavia accorded di-
plomatic recognition each other. This was greatly welcomed by the international 
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community (Samardzjia, 1997, p.24). In the early 1997 Croatia received its fi rst 
credit rating from three important foreign rating agencies, indicating the arrival of 
the period of peace and reconstruction and the end of the period of extreme political 
risk (Jovancevic, 1999, p.242).
Table 2  
BANKS ACCORDING TO THE KINDS OF OWNERSHIP
Source: Jovancevic (1999), p.242
The participation of foreign banks made it easier to rehabilitate Croatian banks. 
The process of bank rehabilitation started in 1996 with four large banks (Slavonska, 
Splitska, Rijecka and Privredna banka). Till then, the banking system in Croatia 
remained concentrated, which means that a small number of banks controlled a 
relatively large share of total assets and revenue. The privatization of banks proce-
eded in such a way that the existing banks were privatized and new private banks 
were established (see Table 2). Foreign banks have participated in the process. 
Whereas only one bank entered the Croatian market before 1996, during the period 
between late 1996 and 1997 six foreign banks opened branches or subsidiaries, 
that has contributed to an atmosphere of intensifi ed competition. In 1998 majority 
of banks (85%) were predominantly privately owned. The shares in total banking 
assets were 70.2%. The other 9 banks (15%) were state-owned (or by majority), 
managing 29.8% of total banking assets (Jovancevic, 1999, pp.241-243). In the 
course of intensifi ed competition among banks, some banks went out of business. 
In 1998 four banks (Dubrovacka, Zupanska, Glumina and Gradska banks), which 
had a huge amount of bad debts, became bankrupt. The losses of those four banks 
were reported about 600 million (Jovancevic, 1999, p.257).
Croatian Economy during the Second Half of 1990s
The economy started to recover in 1994. From 1995 to 1997 its growth rate 
recorded around 6 %. Above all the best performance was shown by building in-
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dustry which was closely related to the reconstruction of the war-damaged-area. 
Even in 1998, however, Croatian economy could not recover its 1990 level, and it 
fell into a negative growth in the second half of 1998. Why?
As mentioned above, domestic sources of funds were limited, and it was, 
therefore, very diffi cult for companies to get bank loans. Until 1995 the amount 
of FDI remained very small. Per capita FDI was decisively small compared with 
other transitional countries in Central Eastern Europe. Due to the fact that capital 
investment in manufacturing industries and services has been unsatisfactorily alre-
ady from the last years of the former Yugoslavia, technologies in Croatia began to 
become obsolete. For example, not so long ago the Croatia was the world’s third 
biggest ship-builder and produced mainly for the world market.. After gaining in-
dependence, however, the shipyards stagnated in state hands and lost international 
competitiveness. Croatia is now the thirteenth in ship-building in the world (Horvat, 
1999, p.55; BCE, May 2000, p.30).
On January 1, 1998 the value-added tax with a fl at rate of 22% was introdu-
ced, replacing sales tax. The annual report of the Ministry of Finance denied its 
negative impact on the economic growth. The Ministry viewed the introduction 
of VAT successful because the 22% VAT meant a substantial reduction of tax rate 
from 26.5% to 22% and, at the same time, it succeeded in increasing the tax revenue 
through a wider grasp of considerable part of the informal economy. Instead, the 
annual report mentioned the negative impact of the fi nancial crisis in East Asia, 
saying that negative perception of investors and increased sensibility to risk in 
the second half of 1997 have resulted in decreased capital investments of foreign 
investors in transition countries (Republic, 1999, pp.9-14).
In the 4th quarter of 1998 the GDP decreased by 0.8%. As causes of the decre-
ase in economic growth, the annual report mentioned aggravating possibilities for 
borrowing in the domestic and foreign markets, the high cost of capital, diffi culties 
in collecting outstanding -debts, decreased growth rates of domestic demand, and a 
lack of higher tourist consumption (Republic, 1999, p.11). This explanation might 
be valid for short-term changes in the economy, but the more fundament cause 
should be sought in the fact that Croatian economy has lost dynamics for its deve-
lopment. Under the fact lie structural problems such as decreased competitiveness 
in the manufacturing industry and the service industry, a delay in restructuring of 
enterprises and the banking sector and hypertrophied public expenditures. During 
the fi rst quarter of 1999 the number of employed persons decreased by 3.2%. The 
unemployment rate jumped from 18.6% in December 1998 to 19.6% in March 
1999. With the recession, the position of the central budget deteriorated. Although 
the budget registered surplus in the previous year, the budget defi cit grew to 1,837 
million kuna during the fi rst quarter of 1999. In order to prevent further deteri-
oration of the balance, in May the government approved a restriction package 
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containing the saving of 3.5 billion kuna in expenditures. At the same time, due 
to the series of banking bankruptcies, large sums had to be spent to replenish the 
deposit insurance fund and to reduce the defi cit of the welfare funds. In addition 
to restrictions in the area of fi scal policy, monetary policy also had to be tightened 
(E T, Vol.8 No.2, pp.129-130).
In 1999 exports and imports both declined. Exports attained US$ 4.27 billion 
(i.e. 5.8% less than in 1998). Imports amounted to US$ 7.77 billion (i.e. 7.2% less 
than in 1998). Although the trade defi cit slightly (US$ 345 million) decreased, its 
amount remained as high as US$ 3.49 billion. Weak performance in the foreign 
trade is ascribed to the fact that no trade preference agreement exists with the EU, 
customs border came into effect with Bosnia-Herzegovina, and structural moder-
nization has hardly begun in the industry (ET, Vol.9 No.1, p.39).
For a long time, Croatia has had a big amount of the defi cit in foreign trade of 
goods. Only a part of foreign trade defi cit has been covered by surplus in services 
and remittances by workers abroad, Therefore, a defi cit in current account has re-
mained, and it has been covered by receipts of sales of Croatian wealth (real estate, 
etc.) to foreigners and by rising foreign debt. In this respect, disastrous occurrences 
in the Balkans have negatively affected Croatian economy. Since autumn 1998 the 
tensions between Yugoslavia and the NATO were rising over confl icts in Kosovo, 
culminating at last in the NATO’s air attacks on Yugoslavia from March to June. 
This time Croatia was not a battlefi eld. During the attacks, however, air fi ghters fl ied 
from basis in Italy to Yugoslavia across the Adriatic Sea. Such tensions discouraged 
foreign tourist who should have visited the Adriatic coast. As a result, the revenue 
from tourism decreased by half. Due to a decrease in the revenue from the tourism 
and the transportation, surplus in the balance of services decreased drastically. The 
accumulated external debts has doubled in four years from US$ 3 billion 699 million 
in 1994 to US$ 8 billion 489 million (Republic, 1999, p.97). In September 1999 
the debt amounted to US$ 9.3 billion, so that the debt due in 2000 equaled US$ 1.7 
billion, which became a heavy burden to the economy (Hrvatski, 1999, p.5).
The problem of inter-companies’ debts became more serious. According to the 
data of the Institution for payment transactions, in June 1999 the companies’ non-
collected overdue debt amounted to 23.3 billion kuna, being 7.3% higher compared 
to the previous month. In August 1999, the amount of the recorded non-collected 
overdue debt increased by almost 62%, or by 8.9 billion kuna, compared to late 
1998 (Hrvatski, 1999, p.7).
Whereas consolidated spending of the state accounted for 40.5% of GDP in 
1994, it grew to 47.9% in 1998, and its share was expected to grow to 49.1 %. If 
the budgets of local authorities are added to government spending and non-budget 
funds, then the total public spending was estimated to ~. account for 70% of GDP 
(Chamber of Economy, 2000, p.9). In the central government budgetary expen-
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diture of 1997 the biggest share was occupied by defense (20.32%), followed 
by social security and welfare affairs and services (18.76%), public order safety 
affairs (12.12%), education (11.78%) and transport and communication (9.98%). 
The budget of 1999 shows a different order with the biggest share being occupied 
by social security and welfare affairs and services (23.07%), followed by defense 
affairs and services (12.88%) and education (12.56%), transport and communication 
(11.65%) and public order and safety affairs (9.73%). In this way, although the 
expenditure for defense and public order has decreased, its share in the state budget 
remained high level. Among non-budget funds the most important were the pension 
fund and the health fund. Defi cits in non-budget funds have been compensated 
by transfers from the central budget. 50.8% of the total transfer from the central 
budget in 1998 went to the pension fund, and 13.9% to the health fund (Republic, 
1999, pp.47-48). As of March 1999, the number of retired persons was nearly one 
million, which seemed too much in a small country with the population of only 4.6 
million. This meant that 1.6 active insured person worked for one retired person 
while in 1990 the relation was 3.2 to 1 (Republic, 1999, p.19). In this regard, the 
working programme of the new government critically mentioned problems such 
as a lack of discipline in the payment of pension and health care insurance, the 
recognition of claims regardless of fi nancial conditions, and greatly uneven rights 
(Government, 2000, p.4). In order to conclude a stand-by credit agreement with 
the IMF, the expenditures of the budget had to be trimmed. As transfers from the 
central budget could not be maintained, it became inevitable to reform the pension 
and health care systems. Similarly, an agreement had to be reached with social 
partners in order to limit wage and price increases. In this way, Croatian economy 
came to a standstill towards the late 1990s (ET, Vol.9 No.1, pp.39-40).
Political Change
The economic diffi culties show that Tudjman’s methods have failed. People 
were dissatisfi ed with the situation in which Tudjman’s adherents had amassed we-
alth while many people suffered poverty. Journal Business Central Europe reports 
the situation in the early 1999: “Opinion polls credit his ruling party - the badly 
divided Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) - with a dismal 20% level of support. 
Worse, the man himself has dropped from the second most respected person in 
the country in January last year, to a pathetic 35th place now” (BCE, Feb. 1999). 
When Tudjman died in December 1999 after a long illness very few heads of fore-
ign countries attended his funeral. In the face of increasing dissatisfaction among 
people, HDZ won only 40 seats out of 151 seats of the Parliament (24.38% of the 
Y. KOYAMA: Transition in Croatia
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 54 (11-12) 979-998 (2003) 993
total votes) at the general election held on January 3, 2000. A centrist and leftist 
union composed of the Social Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party won 
71 seats with a share of 40.84% of the total votes. As a centrist and rightist union, 
which won 24 seats, decided to support from outside of the Cabinet a coalition 
government was formed. A Presidential election taken place January 24, 2000 was 
contested practically by three candidates: former foreign minister Mr. Granic from 
HDZ, Mr. Budisa from the centrist-leftist union, and Mr. Mesic from the centrist-
rightist union, composed of four parties including Peasant Party and National Party. 
As no candidate won a majority of the votes at the fi rst ballot, the second ballot 
was to be held on February 7 between Mr. Budisa, a student leader of `Croatian 
Spring’ in 1971, and Mr. Mesic, who has acted the last President of the former 
Yugoslavia in 1991 and Prime Minister and President of the Parliament of newly 
independent Croatia. As there was no big difference between commitments of both 
candidates like the reduction of the President’s power, the EU membership, etc., 
`personality’ of the candidates became a focus. Finally Mr. Stipe Mesic won with 
56.21 % of the total votes4.
The new Prime Minister of the coalition Government was Ivica Racan, the last 
leader of League of Communists of Croatia and the leader of the Socio-Democratic 
Party. The program of the new Government, based on the public commitment of 
the coalition groups, was a program of change in the Republic of Croatia, aiming 
to build civil society and a democratic and market-oriented state integrated in the 
EU. One of the most important tasks is to change the political system primarily by 
reducing the powers of the President of the State and by strengthening the role of 
parliament and the government. In addition, the new Government was obliged to aim 
to attain such very basic tasks as follows: the promotion of dialogue and tolerance 
for development of democracy and building of civil society; the establishment of an 
independent judiciary and the rule of law; the transformation of the Croatian Televi-
sion from a state-controlled one to a public, independent and responsible medium, 
etc. The new Government aimed to join the WTO and the CEFTA. As for the EU, 
for the time being it aims to be an associate member (Government, 2000).
Prime Minister Racan called on the leaders of state enterprises and institutions 
to resign in order to wind up Tudjman’s economic estate (ET, Vol.9 No.1, p.38). 
Racan administration broke off the nationalistic course. This is exemplifi ed by its 
cooperative position toward The Hague’s international tribunal on war criminals 
in the former Yugoslavia. Leaders of the West welcomed the new government in 
Croatia and tried to put an end to this country’s international isolations5. In June 
4 My description on the elections is based on To oh Fairu [East European File](Kyodo Tsushin 
[Kyodo Correspondence Company]), No.521-522, pp.4-S, Niigata Nippoh [Niigata Daily Newspaper] 
February 9, 2000, and other Japanese Newspapers.
5 According to Journal Business Central Europe, Mr. Racan has handed over sensitive documents 
to the International Criminal Tribunal on war crimes in former Yugoslavia, despite threats from war 
veterans to disrupt the all-important tourist season. He has also invited to UN offi cials to Croatia to 
investigate mass graves, prompting criticism from war veterans (BCE, June 2000, p.43).
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2000 the NATO invited the Croatian government to participate in `Partnership for 
Peace’. This move was enough to upgrade the rating of this country. Meanwhile 
the Croatian government negotiated with the M’ about a new loan. In July 2000 
Croatia was admitted to the WTO. The relation with the EU has improved, and 
the Agreement on Stabilization and Association with the EU was concluded in 
October 2001.
Challenges of Croatia
In the period of Tudjman’s rule, the economic restructuring has been inconsi-
stently implemented. The new government is burdened with numerous tasks to be 
solved. Among others, a cutback in public expenditures entails painful measures 
such as reduction in the number of government employees and their wages, a cut in 
subsidies, reform of pension and medical care systems, etc., but the new government 
is pressed to implement this task fi rst of all. At the same time, the government has 
to tackle with challenges such as the promotion of export, the introduction of fore-
ign capital, the restructuring of enterprises and banks, the improvement of capital 
market, the acceleration of privatization with participation of foreign investors, 
the support to development of agriculture, a decrease in unemployment, minimum 
social protection, etc. In addition, the government must take care of 46,000 di-
splaced persons and 140,000 Croatian refugees from Serbia, Montenegro and BiH 
(Government, 2000; Chamber of Economy, 2000).
The privatization is not completed yet. The challenge to accelerate the priva-
tization with participation of foreign investors is especially important. According 
to Borozan and Barkovic (2002), the situation can be depicted as follows: During 
the fi rst decade (1991-1999) 2,650 companies were involved in privatization. In 
1991 the Croatian Privatization Fund (CPF) possessed 86 billion kuna of the state-
owned portfolio. As a result of the selling, in 1999 there remained a non-privatized 
portfolio for 3.8 billion kuna. However, many companies have ruined under the 
management of Croatian `tycoons’. In that particular year they returned the shares 
of these companies to CPF, so that the portfolio drastically increased again. By 
September 2001 the CPF held 1,203 companies, whose stock capital amounted to 
63.6 billion kuna with the state portfolio being 25.5 billion kuna. The government 
intends to speed up privatization, but most of the available portfolio is not attractive 
due to excessive indebtedness of companies, insolvency, technical obsolescence and 
inadequate structure of personnel. Only about 100 companies in industry, insurance 
and tourism are attractive enough to get foreign investors’ participation.
FDI, which remained a low level in the fi rst half of 1990s, began to increase 
in 1996. It is worthy of notice that FDI increased to US$ 1.6 billion in 1999 (see 
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Table 1). This shows that the Croatian government turned its course to actively 
introduce foreign capitals. In 1999, 35% of shares in Croatian Telecom was sold 
for US$ 850 million to Deutsche Telecom (in 2001 Deutsche Telecom purchased 
another 16% of for US$ 422 million). In the same year 66% of shares of Privredna 
Banka Zagreb was sold to Banca Comerciale Italiana. During the period between 
1993 and 2001 the cumulative FDI in Croatia amounted to US$ 66.4 billion. The 
biggest investor in Croatia is Austria (27.23%), followed by Germany (25.81%), 
USA (18.17%), Luxembourg (5.59%) and Netherlands (3.63%). Data on FDI during 
the same period by sectors show that the most attractive sector is telecommuni-
cation (29.37%), followed by banking (17.26%), pharmaceutical industry (15.41 
%), cement (5.05%), petroleum and gas (3.11%), hotels and catering (2.66%), 
trade (1.67%), bricks and roof tiles, etc.(1.53%), and beer brewery (1.35%). As 
we have seen, nearly half of the total FDI went to telecommunication and banking. 
Apart from pharmaceutical industry, FDI in manufacturing industry is very small. 
FDI in tourism is unexpectedly small. Hereafter it will be necessary to introduce 
bigger amount of foreign capital in these sectors. As the most prosperous type of 
investment, Borozan and Barkovic (2002) mentioned bluefi eld investments - sea 
investments, which are offi cially neglected and ignored.
It is indispensable to improve investment climate in order to attract bigger 
amount of FDI and activate business in the country. Sophisticated communication 
technology and transport infrastructure, which are indispensable in the era of global 
economy, have not suffi ciently developed yet. In addition, there are administrative 
barriers which are hampering the infl ow of FDI. Foreign businessmen have been 
often annoyed by troublesome and time-consuming procedures at various phases 
such as application for entry visas and work permits of foreign managers and wor-
kers, company registration and other business establishment procedures, location 
of business, i.e. land acquisition, construction-related permits, usage permit for 
utility services, etc. Foreign investors commonly complain of such “administrative 
harassment” (Borozan and Barkovic, 2002). In this regard, the Croatian government 
should learn active attitude of the Hungarian government toward FDI.
Croatia aims to join the EU by 2007, but the process seems to be uneasy. As 
other candidate countries have done so far, also Croatia is requested to accept acqui 
communautaire, revise its domestic legal system and restructure its economy in 
order to harmonize with the EU standards. This is an enormously time-consuming 
and energyconsuming process. Bartlett (2002) points out disadvantage of latecomers 
compared with Central East European countries and Baltic countries which will 
be admitted in 2004. The states left out of membership will face higher non-tariff 
barriers, lesser access for their workers to European labour markets, and fi erce 
competition from the new member states than before. The support from the EU 
is very precious for Croatia, but the amount of the support itself has been not so 
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large. In connection with the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe, the EU offers 
the CARDS programme, which replaces the PHARE for the Western Balkans. 
Croatia became one of its recipient. The aim of the CARDS programme is more 
political rather than economic. It is a complementary factor to EBRD and World 
Bank support. It is geared towards actions in political areas, such as democrati-
zation, return of refugees, fi ghts against organized crime and security of borders 
(Bartlett, 2002, p.11).
Although Croatia has the Adriatic coast with an abundance of tourist attra-
ctiveness, it seems very diffi cult to adopt the Norwegian approach6 to the EU. 
Consequently, for several years Croatia will be requested to endeavor to satisfy 
the conditions for the EU membership.
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